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Abstract
When market structure is complete, factor demands by households will be
independent of their characteristics, and households will take their production
decisions as if they were profit-maximizing firms. This observation constitutes
the basis for one of the most popular empirical tests for complete markets,
commonly known as the “separation” hypothesis. In this article, we show
that most existing tests for separation using panel data are potentially biased
towards rejecting the null-hypothesis of complete markets, because of the failure
to adequately control for unobservable household-specific eﬀects. Since the
variables on which the test for separation is based cannot be identifed in most
panel datasets following the usual covariance transformations, and are likely
to be correlated with the household-specific eﬀect, neither the within nor the
variance-components procedures are able to solve the problem. We show that
the Hausman-Taylor 1981 estimator, in which the impact of covariates that are
invariant along one dimension of a panel can be identifed through the use of
covariance transformations of other included variables that are orthogonal to
the household-specific eﬀects as instruments, provides a simple solution. Our
approach is applied to a rich Tunisian dataset in which separation –and thus
the null of complete markets– is strongly rejected using the standard approach,
but is not rejected once correlated unobservable household-specific eﬀects are
controlled for using the Hausman-Taylor instrument set.
Keywords: panel data, household-specific eﬀects, household models, testing
for incomplete markets, development microeconomics, Tunisia.
JEL: O120, C230, D130, D520.
∗We are extremely grateful to the editor and to three anonymous referees whose detailed com-
ments significantly improved the paper. The usual disclaimer applies.
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One of the most widely-used empirical tests for the presence of market imperfections in
developing countries is provided by the so-called “separation” hypothesis. Numerous
papers, including the seminal article by Benjamin (1992), have tested the hypothesis
that factor demands on a farm will be independent of household characteristics, when
market structure is (almost) complete. The early litterature is well summarized in
Singh, Squire, and Strauss (1986), while Udry (1999) covers the more recent literature
as well as providing two careful applications to African plot-level data.
Separation implies that the marginal productivity of inputs will be a function
solely of plot characteristics and prices, and that households take their production
decisions as if they were risk-neutral profit-maximizing firms. In contrast, when
factor demands are a function of household characteristics, marginal productivities
are not equated across households and production is ineﬃcient.
The purpose of this article is to demonstrate that: (i) in most cases, the standard
test for separation using panel data is biased towards rejecting the null-hypothesis
of complete markets because of a problem of unobservable household-specific eﬀects;
(ii) the usual covariance transformations performed on panel data cannot solve this
problem; but (iii) the Hausman and Taylor (1981) estimator can. After developing a
simple plot-level household model that provides a coherent framework within which to
examine the separation hypothesis, we show, using a rich plot-level Tunisian dataset,
that the null-hypothesis of complete markets is rejected using the standard approach,
while it is not once correlated household-specific, time-varying eﬀects are controlled
for using the Hausman-Taylor estimator.
2
The intuition behind our approach
In a plot-level version of the test for separation, the equation being estimated on
agronomic data is given by:
(1) Yiht = Xihtδ + Zhtγ + εiht,
where Yiht is labor usage on plot i, cultivated by household h, at time t, Xiht is a
matrix of plot characteristics, Zht is a matrix of household characteristics, and εiht is
a disturbance term that satisfies the usual Gauss-Markov assumptions. Separation is
then associated with a simple F -test on the exclusion restriction that γ = 0. In one of
the best-known versions of the test for separation (Benjamin 1992), Zht is household
size.
The main problem associated with this procedure is that the disturbance term
εiht can be decomposed into a nested error components structure given by:
(2) εiht = μt + λh + λht + ηiht,
where μt is a shock common to all plots and households at time t, λh is a time-
invariant household eﬀect, λht is a household-time eﬀect, and ηiht is a disturbance
term that satisfies the usual assumptions (see Baltagi, Song and Jung 2001). In most
plot-level datasets used in the literature, each household cultivates several plots. This
is a standard panel data framework, with one dimension being given by plots, the
second by households, and the third by time. Although λh can be accounted for
by a “within” procedure which transforms variables into deviations with respect to
their household-specific means (over all time periods), there remains λht. Since it is
probable that λht is correlated with Zht, the least-squares estimate of γ, even after
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the standard “within” transformation, will be biased with, in the scalar case:
(3) p limbγw = γ + cov[λht, eˆiht]σ2e ,
where σ2e is the variance of the residual eˆiht from the auxiliary “within” regression of
household size on Xiht (see Hsiao 1986, p. 64, equation (3.9.3)).1 If cov[λht, eˆiht] 6= 0,
as is likely in the context of what is essentially a labor demand equation, then all
standard tests of separation are biased towards rejecting the null-hypothesis of complete
markets, when the “true” value of γ is zero. One may therefore reject the null not
because market structure is necessarily incomplete, but simply because of a banal
problem of unobservable heterogeneity. Conversely, assume that the population
value of γ is positive (say, because, labor markets are imperfect and labor usage is
therefore an increasing function of household size), but that cov[λht, eˆiht] < 0. In
the case of a factor demand equation, the second hypothesis is likely to be the case
(for an empirical example, see Gardebroek and Lansink 2003, who find a negative,
though insignificant, correlation between the household-specific eﬀect and family labor
availability, in the context of two variable input demand equations). Then standard
tests of the separation hypothesis could fail to reject the null, if these two eﬀects
cancel out.
The usual econometric response to a problem of unobservable heterogeneity in
panel data is to apply one of the standard covariance transformations, such as the
“within” procedure. Here, this would involve expressing all variables as deviations
with respect to their household-specific means, at a given t. While, under the as-
sumption of the exogeneity of the explanatory variables with respect to ηiht, this
does allow one to recover unbiased estimates of δ, it has the regrettable side-eﬀect of
eliminating the variable(s) upon which the test for separation is based since, when
one sweeps out λht, one also sweeps out Zht. Since it is highly likely that λht is not
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orthogonal to Zht, random eﬀects are not an answer, as they too will yield biased
estimates of γ.
Moreover, standard instrumental variables (IV) procedures, in which one would
simply instrument for Zht, are not usually implementable. This is because admissible
exogenous IVs that would be correlated with Zht but are orthogonal to λht are usually
not available or, if they are, should probably already be included in Zht for theoretical
reasons.
The problem, which is similar in spirit to that of consistently estimating the
returns to education using panel data when schooling is correlated with the individual
eﬀects, can be solved using the Hausman-Taylor (1981, henceforth, HT) IV estimator,
which permits one to control for unobservable household-specific, time varying eﬀects
that are correlated with Zht, while allowing one to identify γ. Our work builds on
previous applications of the HT estimator to the problem of understanding diﬀerences
in productivity among farms using two-dimensional (farm (h)-time period (t)) panel
datasets. Gardebroek and Lansink (2003) consider the determinants of productivity
diﬀerentials among specialized pig breeding farms in the Netherlands, and interpret
the correlation between time-invariant farm variables and the farm-specific eﬀects
in a total factor productivity context. Deininger and Olinto (2000), for their part,
use the HT estimator in order to assess the impact on the productivity of Zambian
farmers of time-invariant household characteristics such as female-headship, distance
to market, the availability of extension services, and farmer education. To the best
of our knowledge, however, the HT estimator has not been used in the context of the
debate concerning the separation hypothesis, and has not been applied to plot-level
data.
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A simple household model
In what follows, we consider a simple theoretical model of a household composed
of two members, and which cultivates several plots of land. We do this because
our use of plot-level Tunisian data in the empirical portion of this article, rather
than data aggregated at the farm level, raises several interesting issues that have
not been adequately underscored in the context of the literature on the separation
hypothesis, with the notable exception of Udry (1996, 1999). We begin by presenting
the Pareto-optimal baseline, and show that the separation property holds at the plot
level, meaning that the marginal productivities of family and hired labor will be
equated across plots cultivated by a given household, as well as between households.
In the next section of the article, we will consider five diﬀerent market imperfections
that can lead to distinct patterns of violations of the separation null. For readers
unfamiliar with household models as applied to developing country agriculture, a
useful primer is provided by Bardhan and Udry (1999).
We assume that there are two types of family members, men and women, and
two types of hired labor, male and female. This corresponds to the situation in
the Tunisian village that will be the object of our empirical analysis. Consider a
household, indexed by h, constituted by two members indexed by j = M,F , that
cultivates several plots of land, indexed by i = 1, ..., Ih. Individual j consumes a
quantity cjk of good k = 1, ...,K; c
j is therefore the 1 × K vector of private goods
consumed by individual j, whereas total household consumption is given by the 1×K
vector c = cM + cF . Total labor supply of individual j is equal to Lj. Public goods
produced within the household are given by Z. Preferences of individual j are
given by U j = U j
¡
cM , cF , Z, LM , LF ,Ω
¢
, where Ω is a vector of taste shifters such as
household demographics or land ownership. This specification of preferences allows
for joint household production, as well as for altruism between household members.
Consider a plot, indexed by i, that is cultivated in crop k. Then output on such a
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plot is given by qki = F k
¡
LMi , LFi ,HMi , HFi , Ai
¢
, where Ai represents the characteris-
tics of plot i, including plot size, soil type and irrigation status, and Hji (L
j
i ) is hired
(family) labor of sex j used on the plot. Using the notation in Udry (1996), where the
set of plots cultivated in crop k are denoted by P k = {i| crop k is grown on plot i},
the total production of crop k by the household is given by:
(4) qk =
X
i∈Pk
qki =
X
i∈Pk
F k
¡
LMi , L
F
i , H
M
i ,H
F
i , Ai
¢
, k = 1, ..., K,
and the 1×K vector of outputs of all goods is given by q = ¡q1, ..., qk, ..., qK¢. Public
good production within the household is given by:
(5) Z = Z
¡
LMZ , L
F
Z
¢
.
The time constraint of household member j is given by:
(6) Lj = LjZ +
X
i
Lji + L
j
W , j =M,F,
where LjW is household member j’s time on the labor market. Finally, letting p =¡
p1, ..., pk, ..., pK
¢
denote the 1 ×K vector of output prices, the household’s budget
constraint is given by:
(7) pc06pq0 − wM
X
i
HMi − wF
X
i
HFi + w
MLMW + w
FLFW + I,
where wj denotes the wage rate paid to hired labor of sex j, and I is non-labor income.
From the usual corollary to the First Theorem of Welfare Economics (see e.g. Varian
1978), and for any Pareto weight λ > 0, the intra-household allocation of resources
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will be Pareto-optimal as long as it solves the problem:
(8) max
{c,L,H,P k}
UM + λUF s.t. (4), (5), (6) and (7).
It is then straightforward to show that the necessary first-order conditions (FOCs)
associated with (8) imply that:
(9)
∂F k
¡
LMi , LFi ,HMi , HFi , Ai
¢
∂Hji
=
∂F k
¡
LMi , LFi ,HMi , HFi , Ai
¢
∂Lji
=
wj
pk
,
for k = 1, ...,K, j = M,F, i = 1, ..., Ih. The conditions given in (9) state that
the marginal productivity of family labor of sex j will be equated to the marginal
productivity of hired labor of the same sex in the production of a given crop, and
that these marginal productivities will be the same across all plots cultivated by a
given household, as well as between households.
Market imperfections
The literature on household models is replete with examples of market imperfections
that lead to violations of the conditions that underly separation. In what follows,
we consider the most commonly appealed to market imperfections and examine their
consequences on the optimality conditions derived above. These market imperfec-
tions include credit constraints, labor market imperfections, imperfect land rental
markets or tenure rights, imperfect insurance markets, marketing constraints, or var-
ious combinations of these.
Credit constraints
Consider the problem given in (8), to which we append a working capital constraint
of the form wM
P
i
HMi + wF
P
i
HFi − wMLMW − wFLFW − I 6 B, where B is the
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working capital available to the household. The assumption in models of this type
is that factor payments must be made at the beginning of the season, leading to
the need for short-term credit. Examples of household models that concentrate on
credit constraints (often in combination with imperfect supervision of hired labor) as
a source of non-separation include Eswaran and Kotwal (1986), Feder (1985), Feder
et al. (1990) and Carter and Wiebe (1990). Let μ denote the Lagrange multiplier
associated with the household’s budget constraint (equation (7)), and let ϕ denote the
Lagrange multiplier associated with the credit constraint. Then the ensuing FOCs
imply that:
∂F k
¡
LMi , LFi ,HMi ,HFi , Ai
¢
∂Lji
=
∂F k
¡
LMi , LFi ,HMi , HFi , Ai
¢
∂Hji
(10a)
=
µ
μ(Ω, I, B) + ϕ(Ω, I, B)
μ(Ω, I, B)
¶
wj
pk
,(10b)
for k = 1, ...,K, j = M,F, i = 1, ..., Ih. These conditions imply that the marginal
productivities of family and hired labor of sex j are equated across plots cultivated by
a given household. In contrast to the separable case, marginal productivities diﬀer
between households, because of the presence of the Lagrange multiplier ϕ, which is
household-specific, and will be a function of household characteristics (Ω, I, B).
Labor market imperfections
Labor market imperfections constitute one of the most commonly appealed to sources
of violations of the separation hypothesis. Representative examples in the literature
include Lopez (1984), Benjamin (1992), Jacoby (1993), Skoufias (1994), Lambert and
Magnac (1995), Sadoulet, DeJanvry and Benjamin (1998), Sonoda and Maruyama
(1999), and Bowlus and Sicular (2003). Consider a constraint on the amount of labor
that a household can "export" on the labor market: LjW 6 L
j
W . Then, denoting the
Lagrange multipliers associated with these constraints by ψj, the ensuing FOCs imply
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that:
∂F k
¡
LMi , LFi ,HMi ,HFi , Ai
¢
∂Hji
=
wj
pk
,(11a)
∂F k
¡
LMi , LFi ,HMi ,HFi , Ai
¢
∂Lji
=
wj
pk
− ψ
j(Ω, I, L
j
W )
μ(Ω, I, L
j
W )pk
,(11b)
for k = 1, ..., K, j = M,F, i = 1, ..., Ih. The first condition implies that the mar-
ginal productivity of hired labor will be equated across plots cultivated by the same
household, as well as across plots cultivated by diﬀerent households. The second con-
dition implies that the marginal productivity of family labor will be equated across
plots cultivated by a given household, but will not be the equated across households.
Moreover, the marginal productivities of family and hired labor will not be equated
within households.
Now consider a constraint on the other side of labor market that takes the form
of a limit on the amount of labor that the household can hire:
P
i
Hji 6 H
j
. Then,
denoting the Lagrange multiplier associated with these constraints by ψj, the FOCs
associated with the problem imply that:
∂F k
¡
LMi , LFi , HMi ,HFi , Ai
¢
∂Hji
=
wj
pk
+
ψj(Ω, I,H
j
)
μ(Ω, I,H
j
)pk
,(12a)
∂F k
¡
LMi , LFi , HMi ,HFi , Ai
¢
∂Lji
=
wj
pk
,(12b)
for k = 1, ...,K, j = M,F, i = 1, ..., Ih. These conditions are the mirror image
of those given in the case of labor exports. The first condition implies that the
marginal productivity of hired labor will be equated across plots cultivated by a
given household, but will diﬀer between households. The second condition implies
that the marginal productivity of family labor will be equated across plots cultivated
by a given household, as well as between households. As with the constraint on the
labor export side, the marginal productivities of family and hired labor will not be
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equated within households.
Marketing constraints
Consider a constraint that takes the form of an upper bound Q
l
on the amount of
crop l that the household can sell. More formally, the constraint in question can be
written as
P
i∈P l
F l
¡
LMi , LFi ,HMi ,HFi , Ai
¢
−
¡
cMl + c
F
l
¢
6 Ql. Letting φl denote the
Lagrange multiplier associated with the constraint, the FOCs that correspond to the
problem then imply that, for those plots on which crop l is grown:
∂F l
¡
LMi , LFi ,HMi , HFi , Ai
¢
∂Lji
=
∂F l
¡
LMi , LFi ,HMi , HFi , Ai
¢
∂Hji
(13a)
=
μ(Ω, I, Ql)wj
μ(Ω, I, Q
l
)pk − φl(Ω, I, Q
l
)
,(13b)
for k = 1, ...,K, j = M,F, i = 1, ..., Ih. These conditions imply that the marginal
productivities of family and hired labor are equated across plots cultivated by a
given household in crop l, but that these marginal productivities will diﬀer between
households. For other crops k 6= l that are not subject to the marketing constraint,
the conditions given in the unconstrained case continue to hold.
Insurance market failure
Barrett (1996) and Kevane (1996) consider the eﬀect on the separation hypothesis
of imperfect insurance markets in conjunction with imperfect labor or land markets.
Here, we focus on insurance market failure alone.
Assume that the production technology on plot i is now given by:
(14) qki = F
k ¡θi, LMi , LFi ,HMi ,HFi , Ai¢ ,
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where θi is a stochastic shock to production. If we denote the vector of stochastic
shocks aﬀecting all of the plots cultivated by household h by θ = (θ1, θ2, ..., θi, ..., θIh)
which is assumed to be distributed according to the joint probability density function
(pdf ) g (θ) then the household’s optimization problem is given by:
(15) max
{c,L,H,P k}
Eθh
£
UM + λUF
¤
s.t. (4), (5), (6) and (7),
where Eθ
£
UM + λUF
¤
=
R ··· R ¡UM + λUF¢ g (θ) dθ1dθ2...dθi...dθIh. In the absence
of an insurance market that would allow the household to equate the marginal utility
of its consumption across states of nature (formally, this would imply a full set of
state-contingent prices, one for each potential realisation of θ), the associated FOCs
which implicitly define optimal labor inputs will then be given by:
Eθ
"µ
∂UM
∂cM1
+ λ
∂UF
∂cM1
¶Ã
∂F k
¡
θi, LMi , LFi ,HMi , HFi , Ai
¢
∂Lji
− w
j
pk
!#
= 0,(16a)
Eθ
"µ
∂UM
∂cM1
+ λ
∂UF
∂cM1
¶Ã
∂F k
¡
θi, LMi , LFi ,HMi , HFi , Ai
¢
∂Hji
− w
j
pk
!#
= 0,(16b)
for j =M,F, i = 1, ..., Ih.2 The consequence of insurance market failure is that opti-
mal input use on plot i is a function not only of plot i’s characteristics but, through the
marginal utility of consumption ∂U
M
∂cM1
+λ∂U
F
∂cM1
, of the characteristics (A1, ..., Ai, ..., AIh)
of all of the plots cultivated by the household. Of course, since the marginal util-
ity of consumption is a function of household characteristics, optimal input use will
also be a function of household characteristics, and marginal productivities will dif-
fer between households. In the absence of other constraints, however, the marginal
productivities of family and hired labor will be equated, within a given household.
12
The tenancy market
The existing literature has focused on imperfect land rental markets or tenure rights
(Gavian and Fafchamps 1996; Carter and Yao 2002), as well as on the interraction
between land and labor market imperfections (Carter and Olinto 2003). To the
best of our knowledge, little or no attention has been devoted to the impact of share
tenancy per se on the separation hypothesis.
Consider now a situation, as is the case in the Tunisian village that will be the
focus of the empirical portion of this article, in which there is an active land rental
market in which sharecropping and fixed rental contracts arise. Let
(17) P km = {i| crop k is grown on plot i under a contract of type m} ,
where m = OO (owner operator), RI (rented in), RO (rented out), SI (sharecropped
in), SO (sharecropped out). When a household rents in plot i under a sharecrop-
ping contract it retains a fraction αi of output and pays a fraction βi of the costs
associated with the plot; when it rents in a plot under a fixed rental contract, it is
residual claimant and pays a fixed rental equal to Ri; when it rents out a plot under
a sharecropping contract, it retains a fraction 1 − αi of output and pays a fraction
1−βi of costs; finally, when a household rents out a plot under a fixed rental contract,
it receives a fixed rental payment equal to Ri. The household’s budget constraint is
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therefore given by:
X
k
pk
¡
cMk + c
F
k
¢
6
X
k
⎛
⎜⎝
X
i∈PkOO∪PkRI
⎡
⎢⎣
pkF k (.)
−
¡
wMHMi + wFHFi
¢
⎤
⎥⎦(18)
+
X
i∈PkSI
⎡
⎢⎣
pkαiF k (.)
−βi
¡
wMHMi + wFHFi
¢
⎤
⎥⎦−
X
i∈PkRI
Ri
+
X
i∈PkSO
⎡
⎢⎣
pk (1− αi)F k (.)
− (1− βi)
¡
wMHMi + wFHFi
¢
⎤
⎥⎦+
X
i∈PkRO
Ri
⎞
⎟⎠
+ wMLMW + w
FLFW + I,
to which, temporarily redefining Ai so that it represents only the surface area of
plot i, one must now append a constraint on land ownership:
P
i∈PO
Ai 6 AO, where
PO = POO ∪ PRO ∪ P SO (the set of plots owned by the household) and where AO
represents household land ownership. Note that the household chooses factor input
use on those plots (i) that it cultivates as an owner-operator (i ∈ P kOO) and (ii) that
it rents in either under a fixed rental (P kRI) or a sharecropping contract (i ∈ P kSI).
It does not choose labor inputs on those plots that it rents out (i ∈ P kSO ∪ P kRO).
Consider a household (the landlord, denoted by superscript L) that wishes to
rent a plot indexed by s to a tenant (denoted by superscript T ). Assume that the
landlord’s problem is given by a standard principal-agent specification with moral
hazard, in which the landlord sets (αs, βs) and chooses the crop k to be grown on the
plot, whereas the tenant chooses factor inputs. Let V
T
denote the tenant household’s
reservation level of welfare. Then the landlord’s optimization problem is given by
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max
{cL,LL,HL,Pk,αs,βs,s∈Pk}
ULM + λLULF s.t. (4), (5), (6), (18) and s.t.
¡
cT , LT , HT
¢
= argmax
{cT ,LT ,HT ,P ki6=s}
UTM + λTUTF ,(19a)
UTM + λTUTF > V T .(19b)
Constraint (19a) is the incentive compatibility constraint which stems from the ten-
ant’s input choices (among other things) being unobservable to the landlord, and it is
the subset
¡
LTMs , LTFs , HTMs , HTFs
¢
on the left-hand-side of (19a) that is of particular
concern to us here. Constraint (19b) is the tenant’s participation constraint.
The key point from the standpoint of the separation hypothesis is that the so-
lution in
¡
αs, βs, s ∈ P k
¢
to the landlord’s optimization problem will be a function
of tenant household characteristics (ΩT , IT , AOT ), and this will be the case even if
the tenant’s production decisions are a priori separable, because of the presence of
the participation constraint. Since V
T
will be a function of (ΩT , IT , AOT ), it fol-
lows that
¡
αs, βs, s ∈ P k
¢
will be so as well. Moreover, if one replaces the simple
principal-agent model sketched above by a Nash bargaining approach in which the
terms of the tenancy contract depend on both parties’ threat points, then the optimal
contract will also be a function of the landlord’s characteristics (ΩL, IL, AOL).3 The
upshot is that the input choices taken by the operator household on a plot under a
tenancy contract will be a function of the eﬀective input prices, since the FOCs for
the operator household that stem from the incentive compatibility constraint (19a)
are given by:
∂F k
¡
LMs , LFs , HMs ,HFs , As
¢
∂Hjs
=
∂F k
¡
LMs , LFs ,HMs , HFs , As
¢
∂Ljs
(20a)
=
βs(ΩT , IT , AOT ,ΩL, IL, AOL)
αs(ΩT , IT , AOT ,ΩL, IL, AOL)
wj
pk
.(20b)
While the input prices in (20b) are parametrically taken by the operator household,
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they are, by construction, functions of the household characteristics of both parties
to the contract. As a result, marginal productivities will not be equated between
households. Moreover, if a tenant household interacts with several landlords, the
eﬀective input prices will diﬀer among plots: as such, marginal productivities will not
necessarily be equated among the plots cultivated by a given tenant household.
Empirical implementation
The eﬀects on the separation null of the market imperfections considered above imply
that a number of household characteristics (Zht in equation (1)) are prime candidates
for tests based on exclusion restrictions. Table 1 summarizes several empirical stud-
ies that have tested the separation hypothesis using exclusion restrictions based on
household demographics (upper part of the table), as well as a number of related
studies that, while not based on the framework set out in equation (1), test the sepa-
ration hypothesis by directly estimating the marginal product of labor (lower part of
table). The household demographics in question correspond to Ω in the theoretical
model presented earlier, and the violation of the separation null in this case is often,
though not exclusively, ascribed to imperfect labor markets.
Table 2 summarizes studies that are based on a broader set of exclusion restric-
tions, including various measures of wealth, land ownership, non-farm income and
the area cultivated on other plots. Wealth and land ownership, while they may
aﬀect preferences (and hence enter Ω), may also be associated with easier access to
credit, and may therefore correspond to an increase in B. An increase in land own-
ership (AO in the theoretical discussion of tenancy), insofar as it is associated with
an active land rental market, may also be associated with a relaxation of any credit
constraints that may exist (to see this, it suﬃces to extract the appropriate working
capital constraint from (18) and the land ownership constraint). Non-farm income,
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on the other hand, clearly corresponds to I. Finally, the area cultivated on other
plots (which sometimes also appears as the total area cultivated by the household)
is linked to the longstanding debate on the relationship between farm size and farm
productivity. While the presence of a binding working capital constraint usually
implies a significant (negative) eﬀect of the area of other plots on plot labor demand,
imperfect insurance markets can also lead to a similar result, if one (reasonably) col-
lapses the vector (A1, ..., Ai, ..., AIh) of the characteristics of all of the plots cultivated
by the household (as in the section on insurance market failure) into the surface area
of other plots (given that the surface of plot i is already included as an explanatory
variable in any plot-level estimation).
Identification strategy
Before considering the use of the HT estimator in the context of tests of the separa-
tion hypothesis, which lies at the heart of this article, it is essential to address the
empirical issues that flow from our theoretical treatment of tenancy. First, observe
that it is essential to control explicitly for the eﬀects of tenancy when estimating labor
demand equations, since failure to do so (given that the terms of tenancy contracts
are themselves functions of operator household characteristics –see equation (20b)),
could result in a spurious rejection of the separation null. A second, related issue,
is that crop choice, on plots under tenancy, is likely to be endogenous. Within the
framework given by equations (1) and (2), this implies that a subset of Xiht, which
we denote by X2iht, will be correlated with λht + ηiht.
Equation (20b) however, furnishes one with an appropriate identification strategy.
Though operator household characteristics are indeed correlated with the terms of
tenancy contracts and with crop choice, they appear as Zht in the structural form, and
are therefore not admissible IVs. Landlord household characteristics, expressed as
deviations with respect to operator household time-specific means (which we denote by
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Wiht) are, on the other hand, admissible IVs, since they are by construction orthogonal
to λht (and thus orthogonal to Zht as well). Moreover, it is very likely that Wiht is
orthogonal with respect to ηiht. Finally, Wiht will be correlated with the terms of the
tenancy contracts (and with crop choice on plots under tenancy) as long as a suﬃcient
number of tenants interact with more than one landlord.4 This last condition (that
the proposed IVs must be suﬃciently "strong": E[W 0ihtX2iht] 6= 0) is essentially an
empirical issue, and we demonstrate below that this appears to be the case in our
data.
Crop choice, which is also correlated with λht+ηiht, warrants additional attention,
but this time because of a problem of degrees of freedom. As will be shown below,
our Tunisian data provide a particularly rich characterization of tenancy, in that one
can control for 8 eﬀective inputs prices (cost-to-output share ratios β/α). But this
wealth comes at a cost in that there are also 9 crops grown in the village. Despite
possessing a plethora of landlord household characteristics with which to instrument
the cost-to-output share ratios, these are not suﬃcient to instrument crop choice
directly as well. The solution we adopt here is inspired by Thomas and Strauss
(1997) who, while estimating a Mincerian wage equation while needing to control for
a worker’s sectoral choice, collapse the latter into a scalar hazard rate stemming from
a first-stage multinomial logit procedure. Here, this means performing a multinomial
logit estimation on crop choice, using landlord characteristics as explanatory variables
(alongside other exogenous plot characteristics in order to avoid running a "forbidden
regression"), and inserting the predicted hazard rate as an explanatory variable in
Xiht, in place of the 8 crop choice dummies. Careful attention must then be paid
to the estimated variance-covariance matrix at the second stage, given the generated
nature of the regressor.
Identification of the operator household characteristics Zht while simultaneously
controlling for household-time specific eﬀects λht, which constitutes the crux of our
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approach to testing the separation null, is achieved through the IVs provided by the
HT procedure, to which we now turn.
Adapting the Hausman-Taylor instrument set
Consider the specification given in equation (1), where we divide Xiht into two parts:
Xiht = [X1iht;X2iht]. Recall that X2iht denotes those elements of Xiht that stem
from tenancy (the cost shares and the predicted crop choice hazard rate) and that
are correlated with λht + ηiht. The problem of consistently estimating their impact
on Yiht was addressed above, using "conventional" excluded IVs. Setting X2iht aside,
let X1iht be those remaining elements of Xiht that are uncorrelated with λht + ηiht.
The matrix of time-varying household characteristics Zht is assumed to be correlated
with λht, while being orthogonal to ηiht.5
The set of IVs proposed by HT (1981), adapted to the three-dimensional panel
structure and to our slightly more complicated context in which E[X 02ihtηiht] 6= 0
(in the original HT specification they assume that E[X 02ihtηiht] = 0), is therefore
[QvtX1iht;PvtX1iht], where Pvt and Qvt are the idempotent matrices that perform the
“between” and “within” transformations at time t, respectively. Under the assump-
tion that X1iht is uncorrelated with λht + ηiht, QvtX1iht and PvtX1iht are legitimate
IVs since E[(QvtX1iht)0(λht + ηiht)] = E[(PvtX1iht)0(λht + ηiht)] = 0. The basic intu-
ition behind the HT estimator is that only the λht component of the error term is
correlated with Zht, which allows one to use PvtX1iht as IVs for Zht. The HT esti-
mator therefore allows one to control for unobservable correlated household-specific
time-varying eﬀects λht, while allowing one to identify the parameters of interest (γ)
in the context of testing for separation. A necessary condition for identification is
that the number of elements of X1iht be greater than the number of elements of Zht
(HT 1981, Proposition 3.2, p. 1385). These results have been extended by Ame-
mya and MaCurdy (1986) and Breusch, Mizon, and Schmidt (1989) who suggest a
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broader set of IVs that should improve eﬃciency. Their approach, however, is only
possible on balanced data, which is not the case in the dataset used in this article
or, for that matter, in most plot-level agronomic datasets. Moreover, Baltagi and
Khanti-Akom (1990) and Cornwell and Rupert (1988) have shown that the gains in
eﬃciency obtained by using these extended HT instrument sets are very limited.
The usual manner of addressing the unbalanced nature of panel data in the context
of the HT estimator is described by Gardner (1998), which Gardebroek and Lansink
(2003) have extended to the context of system estimation. Here, we deal with the
unbalanced nature of the panel and estimate the variance-covariance matrix in a
slightly more flexible manner, for three reasons. First, given that one of the explana-
tory variables –the predicted crop choice hazard rate– is a generated regressor, we
bootstrap all standard errors (using 500 replications). Second, while θ-diﬀerencing,
as set out in the original HT procedure (and subsequently adapted by Gardner 1998),
is the most eﬃcient estimator when the error structure does indeed correspond to a
random eﬀects specification, it is highly likely in plot-level data that the disturbance
term ηiht is correlated across plots operated by a given household. This implies a less
stringent structure for the variance-covariance matrix, and involves clustering of ηiht
at the household-time (ht) level. By allowing for arbitrary intra-cluster correlation
and heteroskedasticity at the household-time level, we thus relax the assumption that
the correlation within each cluster is constant and has a nested form. Finally, given
that the key explanatory variables (Zht) are at a higher level of aggregation than the
dependent variable, the usual arguments of Moulton (1986, 1990) suggest that failure
to control for intra-household clustering will result in downward bias in the estimated
standard errors.
In summary, our identification strategy is provided by a combination of conven-
tional "excluded" IVs and those furnished by the HT procedure. The correlation
of X2iht with λht + ηiht is purged through the conventional IVs Wiht, whereas that
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between Zht and λht is eliminated using the HT IVs PvtX1iht, with QvtX1iht, the re-
maining component of X1iht, identifying X1iht. Notice also that identification of the
parameters associated with the separation null (γ) is achieved entirely through the
HT IVs (and not through Wiht), since E[W 0ihtZht] = 0 by construction.
6
The three-dimensional nature of our dataset allows us an additional degree of free-
dom in terms of the definition of HT-type IVs. Above, we considered orthogonality
conditions of a component of Xiht (PvtX1iht) with respect to λht+ηiht. But the three-
dimensional nature of the data also allows us to construct IVs based on orthogonality
conditions with respect to variables that have been purged of their time-invariant
household-specific component which is correlated with λh. An advantage of this pro-
cedure is that, in empirical applications, the orthogonality of PvtX1iht with respect
to λh could be suspect. Purging PvtX1iht of its component that is correlated with
the time-invariant household eﬀect, λh, should render it more palatable as a potential
instrument set. In that case, the set of HT-type IVs is given by [QvtX1iht; eX1iht],
where eX1iht = Qv(PvtX1iht) denotes the matrix of HT IVs that has been purged of its
component which is correlated with λh.
The village and the exclusion restrictions
The data used in this article were collected in the village of El Oulja, Tunisia, which
has been extensively described in Matoussi and Nugent (1989) and Laﬀont and Ma-
toussi (1995). The village lies in the Medjerda river valley in northwestern Tunisia,
in the governorate of Beja. The agricultural zone in question is one of the most
fertile in Tunisia, with more than three quarters of plots having access to irrigation.
A substantial portion of the crops grown in the village are destined for the produce
markets of Tunis, which is, however, 100 km away, with road conditions being some-
times diﬃcult during the winter rains (i.e. marketing constraints may be binding for
some of the bulkier crops). Descriptive statistics corresponding to the variables used
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in the empirical work are presented in tables 3 and 4. As in the theoretical model,
our data allow us to distinguish between four types of labor inputs
¡
LMi , LFi ,HMi ,HFi
¢
on each plot: family and hired labor, which is then further divided into its male and
female components. Average labor input per hectare (expressed in person days over
the year) is equal to 79 for male family labor (LMi ), 32 for female family labor (LFi ),
39 for male hired labor (HMi ) and 42 for female hired labor (HFi ). The average total
labor input per hectare is equal to 194 person days.
Plot characteristics include four soil types (clay, red, sandy and "barren" soil,
with the mixed soil type being the excluded category), irrigation status, and plot
size.7 These six variables constitute our X1iht matrix, with the exception of plot
size, which we assume to be correlated with λht, as it may be set by landlords on
plots under tenancy (to put things explicitly, we use Qvt(plot size) as an IV, and do
not use Pvt(plot size)). However, it is a priori unlikely that plot size is correlated
with λht, in that this variable is largely determined by the rigid crop rotation cycle
in the village, and landlords have very little latitude in adjusting plot size on an ad
hoc basis. The same argument holds for the soil type of each plot.
The land rental market is active in the village, and this is reflected in our data:
approximately one quarter (124) of the 477 plots in our sample are farmed under either
sharecropping (45 plots) or fixed rental contracts (79 plots), with both contractual
forms involving cost-sharing, although this is relatively infrequent under fixed rental.
Though there is no variation in input prices (w
j
pk
) because the data correspond to a
single village, heterogeneity in cost-shares induces variation in the eﬀective price faced
by the households cultivating the plots of land. On sharecropped plots, slightly more
than one half of the cost-shares (β) are equal to 50%, one third 100%, one sixth 0%,
with the remainder being equal to 75, 70 or 66%. Similarly, though the output shares
(α) tend to cluster around the focal point of 50%, α is equal to 75, 70 or 66% on 13%
of sharecropped plots. Descriptive statistics concerning the cost- and output-sharing
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components of the tenancy contracts (where we group plots under sharecropping and
fixed rental together) are reported in table 4. The 8 cost-to-output share ratios, plus
the predicted crop choice hazard rate constitute the matrix X2iht.
On average, operator households cultivate 3.1 plots per year. When they rent in
plots under tenancy contracts, 54% of operator households interact with two or more
landlords. This ensures that there is enough within-operator household variation in
the elements of Wiht for them to be able to act as IVs for the cost-to-output share
ratios and the predicted crop choice hazard rate. The twelve landlord characteristics
included in Wiht are non-agricultural income, landownership, residency status (in the
village or not), occupational status (peasant or not), years of schooling, net wealth,
household size, prime-age females in household, value of livestock, value of agricultural
machinery, age, and pension income.
We consider four variables for our test of the separation null, based on our the-
oretical plot-level model of the household, as well as on the most common empirical
specifications summarized in tables 1 and 2. Descriptive statistics corresponding to
the variables in question are presented in the lower portion of table 3. The first
three variables correspond to Zht. The first exclusion restriction is based on house-
hold demographics (an element of Ω), and involves the operator household’s stock of
prime-age labor. This variable is likely to be correlated with λht in the presence,
for example, of unobservable health shocks to adult household members. The second
exclusion restriction takes the form of household land ownership (AO in the theoreti-
cal discussion of tenancy), which is a major component of household wealth (part of
Ω), and may also aﬀect credit availability (B). This last interpretation renders the
correlation of land ownership with λht highly probable, in that many credit trans-
actions in the village take place informally (and go unreported), and involve female
household members.8 The third exclusion restriction involves short-term liquidity
(I), represented by household non-farm, transfer and pension income. Here, unob-
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servable income or consumption shocks to the household render it likely that I and
λht are correlated.
Our fourth exclusion restriction, which belongs either in X1iht or in X2iht depend-
ing upon the orthogonality assumptions one is willing to make, is given by the area of
other plots farmed by the household (to use the notation of the subsection on tenancy,
this corresponds to
P
r 6=i,r∈Pall
Ar, where P all = POO ∪ PRI ∪ P SI , for plot i). While
a significant negative coeﬃcient associated with this variable is sometimes linked, as
mentioned earlier, with the debate surrounding the inverse farm size/productivity
relationship, at least three other interpretations are possible.
First, as noted by Udry (1999), a significant negative coeﬃcient can provide indi-
cation of a binding working capital constraint, as it implies that inputs are diluted on
a given plot as the area farmed on other plots increases. Second, however, and as in-
dicated in our theoretical model, a statistically significant coeﬃcient associated with
this variable (once household specific time-varying eﬀects are controlled for) implies
that the marginal productivity of the labor input in question is not equated across
plots cultivated by a given household, since the variable in question is, by construc-
tion, plot-specific. In terms of our theoretical model, this would provide evidence
in favor of missing insurance markets, though the fact that tenants usually interact
with more than one landlord could also yield the result, as shown in the subsection
on tenancy. Finally, if one is willing to relax the assumption (on which our theoret-
ical interpretations are based, see the basic optimization problem posed in (8)) of a
Pareto-optimal intra-household model, such a finding would also be consistent with
an ineﬃcient intra-household allocation of resources. Compelling empirical evidence
against the assumption of intra-household Pareto-optimality, in a Burkinabè context,
has been provided by Udry (1996).
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Results
Our empirical results are presented in tables 5 and 6. Many households did not
engage in crop production in the second survey year (1995) because of adverse climatic
shocks; this explains why the number of household-years (ht) is much smaller than
twice the number of households (h). A year dummy is included in all specifications
(coeﬃcient not presented). In the interests of brevity, we report joint significance
tests for the four soil type dummies, the eight cost-to-output share ratios and, for the
pooling estimator results (table 5), the eight crop choice dummies.
Results corresponding to the standard test for separation, which does not take the
endogeneity of contractual choice and crop choice into account, and which does not
control for household-time specific eﬀects, are presented in table 5. This corresponds
to a pooling estimator, in which we do, however, allow for clustering at the household-
time level in order to render our results comparable with the IV results presented later.
As should be obvious from the uppermost part of the table, which groups together the
parameter estimates corresponding to our four exclusion restrictions, the data reveal
an unambiguous rejection of the separation null, for each type of labor. The only
exclusion restriction that is never rejected corresponds to our measure of short-term
liquity.
Thiree aspects of these results are worth noting. First, the stock of prime-age
labor is positive and statistically significant in the male family labor equation, and
insignificant in the three others. Second, land ownership is negative and statistically
significant in the male family and hired labor equations. Third, the area on other
plots increases the demand for male and female hired labor, while it decreases the
demand for female family labor. The first result suggests that there are constraints
on hiring in male labor, while the negative coeﬃcient associated with the area of
other plots in the female family labor equation could indicate a binding working
capital constraint. The negative coeﬃcient associated with land ownership in the
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male family labor equation suggests, if land ownership is an indication of wealth,
substitution eﬀects in favor of additional leisure. On the other hand, the negative
coeﬃcient associated with land ownership in the male hired labor equation, and the
positive coeﬃcients associated with the area of other plots in the two hired labor
equations are puzzling, though the sign of the last two coeﬃcients is compatible with
a model in the spirit of Feder (1985) which combines a credit constraint with costs to
supervising hired labor. These last two positive coeﬃcients are of course suggestive
of a positive relationship between land holdings and hired labor demand.
As noted in the introduction, as well as in our discussion of our exclusion re-
strictions, it is likely that the variables corresponding to our exclusion restrictions
are correlated with λht, rendering the results presented in table 5 suspect. This is
confirmed by the appropriate Hausman tests, which compare a household-time fixed
eﬀects specification with the corresponding household-time random eﬀects specifi-
cation: for all four types of labor, the Hausman test rejects, with an extremely
low p−value in all cases, as reported in the lowermost line of table 5. The bias
identified in equation (3) is therefore manifestly present in conventional tests of the
null-hypothesis of complete markets using this panel dataset, given that one strongly
rejects the null of the absence of correlation between our exclusion restrictions and
λht. Of course, household-time (λht) fixed eﬀects would not allow one to test for
separation at all in that they would also sweep out the impact of three of our four
exclusion restrictions (those based on Zht).
In table 6, we present results corresponding to our approach to testing for sep-
aration, based on endogenizing tenancy contracts and crop choice using "external"
instruments, and dealing with the correlation between Zht and λht using our modi-
fication of the HT instrument set.9 The results are striking. In contrast to what
was found in table 5, the null of complete markets is not rejected for any of the
labor demand equations, in that none of the exclusions restrictions are individually
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rejected, at the usual levels of confidence. This is confirmed by the joint tests of the
significance of the variables associated with our exclusion restrictions, which do not
reject the null of separation, at the usual levels of confidence.
The lower part of table 5 reports a number of diagnostic tests of the validity of
our IVs. We begin by presenting the Hansen test of the overidentifying restrictions.
For all four labor demand equations, the Hansen test does not lead one to reject the
orthogonality of our proposed instrument set with respect to the disturbance term,
with p−values that are all greater than 0.07. However, the Hansen test is potentially
inconclusive insofar as it is based on the strong maintained assumption that at least
as many IVs as the number of endogenous variables are, indeed, exogenous. As the
Hausman-Taylor procedure is very sensitive to the choice of the variables included
in X1iht and X2iht, we compute (for each labor demand equation) three "diﬀerence
Hansen" test statistics which enable us to assess the validity of subsets of IVs (Hayashi
2000). First, we test whether Qvt(log surface of plot) is a valid IV (as assumed
in the specification presented in table 6) and do not reject. Second, we do the
same for Qvt(area on other plots); again, we do not reject. Third, we test the
specification presented in table 6 against the weaker identification strategy (suggested
in the subsection on our adaptation of the HT instrument set) in which the matrix
of HT IVs is given by [QvtX1iht; eX1iht] = [QvtX1iht;Qv(PvtX1iht)]. Once again, we do
not reject the validity of the specification presented in table 6.10
Despite the results of these tests, which do not reject the validity of our iden-
tification strategy, there remains the issue of the second condition which must be
satisfied by any set of admissible IVs, namely the "strength" of their correlation with
the jointly endogenous variables. This point is extremely important in the context
of any IV estimation procedure, given the current preoccupation with the "weak in-
struments" problem (see the excellent surveys by Stock, Wright, and Yogo 2002 and
Hahn and Hausman 2003, and a recent very short primer on the ensuing biases by
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Hahn and Hausman 2002b).
Our diagnostic tool for assessing this aspect of the validity of our identification
strategy is the Hahn and Hausman (2002a) m3 test, based on the bias-adjusted 2SLS
(B2SLS) estimator proposed by Donald and Newey (2001) (see Hausman, Stock, and
Yogo 2005 for the appropriate Montecarlo evidence). The m3 statistic is a joint test
of instrument validity (the orthogonality of the IVs with respect to the disturbance
term) and instrument strength (the correlation of the IVs with the jointly endogenous
explanatory variables). Moreover, it is preferable to traditional diagnostic tools
for assessing instrument relevance (such as partial F−statistics from the first-stage
reduced forms) which have been shown in recent work, such as Cruz and Moreira
(2005), to be extremely poor indicators of instrument weakness. Results of the
Hahn-Hausman tests, for each labor demand equation, are presented in the last line
of table 6, and none reject. Taken together with the non-rejection of the tests of
the overidentifying restrictions and the diﬀerence-Hansen tests, this suggests that the
identification strategy developed in this paper is reasonable and that our results are
not driven by a weak instruments problem.
Finally, note that the Hahn-Hausman tests (not reported) of a specification in
which Pvt(log surface of plot) is added to the instrument set soundly reject for all
four labor demands, while the corresponding Hansen tests of the overidentifying re-
strictions do not. While the second finding suggests that plot size is exogenously
determined, and is not chosen by landlords, the outcomes of the Hahn-Hausman tests
lead us to remain agnostic concerning the validity of this IV, and warrant basing
one’s conclusion concerning the separation null on the less restrictive specification
presented in table 6.
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Concluding remarks
This article has shown that the rejection of the null-hypothesis of complete markets in
household models, based on the widely-used test of the exclusion restrictions implied
by separation, can be due to the bias stemming from uncontrolled-for unobservable
household-specific heterogeneity, as well as from more conventional endogeneity con-
cerns, such as those linked to tenancy markets. We have developed an alternative
approach to this problem, based in part on the instruments suggested by the HT
procedure, which we believe furnishes a better answer to this important question.
Our results bring the methodology of testing for separation using panel data into
sharper focus. This is because, using our approach, we do not reject the null hy-
pothesis of complete markets, conditional on λht. If one estimates a labor demand
function on US individual firm data, as in Griliches and Hausman (1986), one finds
correlated individual firms eﬀects, as we have found here for household time-period
eﬀects. Thus, by analogy, profit-maximizing behavior by firms is not incompatible
with correlated firm-specific eﬀects. However, in our dataset, since labor demand
is a function λht, it is not independent of household characteristics per se, although
they are unobservable characteristics. If separation is taken in its strictest sense to
mean that factor demands should be independent of household characteristics, un-
conditional on λht, then we do in fact reject the null-hypothesis of complete markets.
The key point here revolves around what type of household characteristics fall under
the λh and λht headings. If they are made up of household characteristics that only
aﬀect labor demand through their impact on the production technology, and the null
of separation is not rejected, then the concept of conditional separation has mean-
ingful operational content. If this condition is not satisfied, and the examples of
correlated household-time specific shocks that we have given in this article suggest
that this may sometimes be the case, testing for separation in agricultural household
models may be partially devoid of meaning.
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Despite this caveat, a final point concerns the use to which tests of the separation
hypothesis are put. As noted by several authors, including Udry (1999), the pattern of
violations of the separation null often allows one to infer which markets are imperfect.
Indeed, the purpose of constructing simple theoretical models of the household in the
presence of imperfect markets –such as the one sketched in this article– is often to
provide one with comparative statics results which allow one to do just that. Since
this article has shown that failing to control for correlated household-time specific
eﬀects can significantly bias empirical tests of the separation hypothesis, we believe
that our approach to the problem can provide more robust evidence concerning which
market imperfections aﬀect the agricultural sector of developing countries.
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Notes
1There is a corresponding matrix expression when Zht involves several household
characteristics.
2In deriving these conditions, we have carried out the substitutions in such a
manner that the expressions depend upon the marginal utility of consumption of
good 1. There are, of course, K other normalizations that are possible, given the
optimality conditions that link the marginal utilities of consumption of the K − 1
other goods.
3This would also be true if one retained the one-sided principal-agent framework
(in which all of the bargaining power is on the landlord’s side) and the landlord’s
decisionmaking problem were non-separable.
4A simple thought-experiment should suﬃce to convince one of the validity of
this statement. Consider a pure tenant household that interacts with only one
landlord. Then landlord characteristics, expressed as deviations with respect to
the operator household time-specific means, would all be equal to zero and would
oﬀer no identification whatsoever. While the presence of tenant/owner operator
households who interact with only one landlord also ensures identification using our
proposed instruments, this is slightly misleading since the identification stems solely
from diﬀerences in characteristics between the landlord and the tenant household.
The "true" source of identification in our empirical procedure therefore stems from
tenants (who may also cultivate plots as owner-operators) who interact with several
landlords; such tenants account for more than half of the plots under tenancy in our
data.
5This means that all of the elements of Zht correspond, in the standard HT nota-
tion, to Z2ht, and that there are no Z1ht variables.
6As we shall see below, one exception to this statement will be constituted by the
area cultivated by the household on other plots, which is plot-specific by construction.
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Its impact can therefore be identified either (i) through the HT instrument set, (ii)
through the excluded instruments (Wiht, or through a combination of both), or (iii)
by allowing it to be exogenous (and therefore, classifying it as a component of X1iht).
7Irrigation status is not the value of the irrigation input, rather, it is a dummy
variable that indicates whether a plot can be irrigated or not; given that irrigation
status depends upon a plot being geographically situated close to an irrigation canal,
it is likely that this plot characteristic can be assumed to be exogenously determined.
8This also explains, given the traditional North African context, why male house-
hold heads are often reluctant to report them.
9It is worth noting that the multinomial logit procedure that underlies our endo-
genization of crop choice performs quite well. The associated pseudo-R2 is equal to
0.331, while the joint test of the null of zero slope coeﬃcients has a p−value below
0.001.
10Obviously, testing this subset of overidentifying restrictions is only valid under
the maintained hypothesis that eX1iht is uncorrelated with the household-time eﬀects.
These are the weakest identifying assumptions that allow one to implement the HT
estimator in the present context.
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Table 1: Tests of the Separation Hypothesis Based on Exclusion Restrictions on
Household Demographic Characteristics, and Tests of the Separation Hypothesis
Based on Estimating the Marginal Product of Labor
Tests of the Separation Hypothesis Based on Exclusion
Restrictions on Household Demographic Characteristics
Authors Dataset Exclusion Estimated Separation
restrictions equation(s) null
Pitt and Indonesia, Family morbidity (no. Farm profits Not
Rosenzweig 1986 1978 of sick days) rejected
Deolalikar 1988 India, Hh. size and Farm outputs Rejected
1976-78 weight-for-height
Benjamin 1992 Java, Hh. size and Hh. labor Not
1980 composition demand rejected
Bowlus and China, Hh. size and Hh. labor Rejected
Sicular 2003 1990-1993 composition demand
Grimard 2000 Côte d’Ivoire, Hh. composition Farm labor Rejected
1986 demand
Tests of the Separation Hypothesis Based on
Estimating the Marginal Product of Labor
Authors Dataset Estimated Marg. prod Separation
marg. prod function of null
Carter and Kenya, Labor and Land Rejected
Wiebe 1990 1989 fertilizer
Jacoby 1993 Peru, Labor Wage and Rejected
1985/86 constant
Skoufias 1994 India, Labor Wage and Rejected
1975-79 constant
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Table 2: Tests of the Separation Hypothesis Based on Exclusion Restrictions on
Household Demographic and Other Characteristics.
Authors Dataset Exclusion Estimated Separation
restrictions equation(s) null
Feder China, Liquid assets, hh. size, Output supply Rejected
et al. 1990 1987 size of hh. labor force
Benjamin 1994 Java, Area harvested Farm output, Rejected
1980 (previous year) labor demand
Barrett 1996 Madagascar, Land holding, hh. size Marketable Rejected
1990 and income surplus
Kevane 1996 Sudan, Wealth, land and Yield per Rejected
1990 labor endowments hectare
Gavian and Niger, Hh. manpower, Qty. manure Rejected
Fafchamps 1996 1990-91 proxies for hh. wealth on field
Sadoulet, DeJanvry Mexico, Hh. endowment of Labor Rejected
and Benjamin 1998 1994 unskilled and skilled intensity
labor, hh. migration
assets, assets aﬀecting
utility
Udry 1999 Burkina Faso, Hh. size, non-farm Plot output, Rejected
1981-85, Kenya, wealth, total area plot labor
1985-87 on other plots demand
Carter and China, Land-labor Labor demand Rejected
Yao 2002 1988, 1993 endowment ratio
Carter and Paraguay, Land property rights Cap. invest. Rejected
Olinto 2003 1991, 1994 demand
Vakis et al. 2004 Peru, Hh labor endowment Hh.’s on-farm Rejected
1997 and cons. chars., hours work
worked oﬀ-farm
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Table 3: Summary Statistics: Labor Inputs and Output, Plot Characteristics,
Cropping Choice, Operator Household Characteristics (477 Plots (i),107 Households
(h), 155 Household Time-Periods (ht))
Mean Standard deviation
total "within"
operator
household
Labor inputs in person days per hectare (Yiht)
Female family labor 32 87 51
Female hired labor 42 107 87
Male family labor 79 126 89
Male hired labor 39 84 66
Output (Tunisian dinars) 6,294 13,635 10,379
Plot characteristics (X1iht)
Soil type 1 (clay) 0.190 0.393 0.232
Soil type 2 (red earth) 0.201 0.401 0.244
Soil type 3 (sandy) 0.446 0.497 0.291
Soil type 4 (barren) 0.058 0.235 0.183
Irrigated plot status dummy 0.882 0.322 0.253
Surface of plot (hectares) 5.615 13.535 8.989
Crop choice (X2iht)
Wheat 0.201 0.401 0.327
Other grains 0.071 0.257 0.208
Potato 0.096 0.295 0.273
Onions 0.071 0.257 0.236
Garden vegetables 0.228 0.420 0.354
Tomato 0.113 0.317 0.291
Beetroot 0.025 0.156 0.137
Melon 0.073 0.261 0.218
Fodder 0.119 0.324 0.286
Exclusion restrictions
Operator household characteristics (Zht):
Prime-age adults 5.08 3.10 0.61
Land ownership 22.59 61.15 12.12
Short-term liquidity 744.09 1701.41 1151.08
Area on other plots 20.57 36.62 12.07
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Table 4: Summary Statistics: Share of Output Accruing to, and Share of Costs
Borne by the Household Operating the Plot, Excluded IVs (477 Plots (i),107
Households (h), 155 Household Time-Periods (ht))
All plots Plots under tenancy
Mean Std. dev. Mean Std. dev.
total within total within
oper. oper.
hh. hh.
Share of output accruing to operator: % (α)
Output 95.53 14.02 9.68 83.72 22.94 13.68
Share of costs borne by the operator: % (β)
Chemical fertilizer 96.05 14.20 9.36 85.64 24.24 13.73
Manure 96.43 13.66 9.23 87.02 23.68 13.50
Irrigation 95.56 16.21 10.74 83.86 27.79 17.50
Plowing 94.75 20.88 13.40 80.90 36.46 20.78
Family labor 98.82 7.92 6.82 95.73 14.71 10.51
Hired labor 97.69 12.33 9.58 91.60 22.49 15.19
Seeds 96.05 13.84 8.89 85.61 23.46 12.40
Transportation 95.91 15.84 9.37 85.11 27.52 14.20
Excluded IVs: landlord household characteristics (Wiht)
Non ag. income (dinars) 670.11 1,914 1,351 663.54 2,382 307
Pension income (dinars) 60.77 409.93 127.59 75.38 430.73 221.82
Value of livestock (dinars) 5,247 11,396 6,082 1,339 9,348 8,014
Value of ag. machine. (dinars) 12,059 21,141 11,536 6,598 22,894 12,055
Net wealth (dinars) 22,432 38,020 18,373 17,855 36,899 28,600
Land ownership (hectares) 30.01 78.41 32.84 34.52 96.65 51.05
Schooling of head (years) 4.48 4.97 2.26 5.23 4.82 2.48
Age of head (years) 51.94 13.33 6.27 51.03 11.07 6.54
Size of household 7.17 4.38 2.26 5.32 1.66 0.93
Number of prime-age females 2.04 1.61 0.73 1.19 1.08 0.55
Resident landlord dummy (%) 87.42 33.19 20.30 64.12 48.14 23.91
Peasant landlord dummy (%) 73.16 44.35 29.37 30.53 46.23 26.74
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Table 5: Labor Demand Equations: Pooling Estimator, t-statistics in parentheses
(477 Plots (i),107 Households (h), 155 Household Time-Periods (ht))
Dependent variable (log per hectare) Family labor Hired labor
Male Female Male Female
LMi LFi HMi HFi
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Exclusion restrictions
Operator household characteristics:
Prime-age adults 0.765
(4.04)
0.430
(1.74)
−0.255
(−0.80)
−0.199
(−0.92)
Land ownership −0.370
(−4.76)
−0.102
(−0.99)
−0.506
(−3.58)
−0.204
(−1.60)
Short-term liquidity −0.007
(−0.27)
−0.034
(−1.14)
0.017
(0.47)
0.073
(2.80)
Area on other plots 0.011
(0.17)
−0.323
(−3.25)
0.568
(4.66)
0.274
(3.13)
Plot characteristics
Log surface of plot −0.956
(−12.35)
−1.057
(−10.97)
−0.501
(−3.61)
−0.558
(−4.41)
Plot irrigation status 0.275
(1.78)
−0.361
(−1.78)
0.483
(1.41)
0.351
(1.30)
Joint signif. of crop dummies : χ28
[p−value]
136.56
[0.00]
5.28
[0.00]
69.71
[0.00]
363.39
[0.00]
Joint signif. of soil types : χ24
[p−value]
10.60
[0.03]
5.24
[0.26]
12.23
[0.01]
7.62
[0.10]
Joint signif. of cost shares : χ28
[p−value]
1.60
[0.99]
6.55
[0.58]
0.84
[0.99]
1.99
[0.98]
Joint signif. of exclusion restrictions: χ24
[p−value]
36.32
[0.00]
23.63
[0.00]
22.80
[0.00]
12.00
[0.01]
Hausman test, λht-RE versus λht-FE: χ223
[p−value]
33.28
[0.07]
50.97
[0.00]
45.57
[0.00]
66.56
[0.00]
R2 0.743 0.716 0.407 0.639
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Table 6: Labor Demand Equations: Instrumental Variables Estimates, t-statistics
in parentheses (477 Plots (i),107 Households (h), 155 Household Time-Periods (ht))
.
Dependent variable (log per hectare) Family labor Hired labor
Male Female Male Female
LMi LFi HMi HFi
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Exclusion restrictions
Operator household characteristics (Zht):
Prime-age adults 2.791
(0.88)
−0.811
(−0.31)
−1.059
(−0.33)
0.976
(0.16)
Land ownership −1.348
(−1.54)
−0.323
(−0.47)
−0.891
(−1.03)
−1.039
(−0.58)
Short-term liquidity 0.404
(0.84)
−0.060
(−0.15)
−0.034
(−0.06)
0.368
(0.46)
Area on other plots (X1iht) 0.700
(1.15)
−0.113
(−0.25)
0.712
(1.14)
0.855
(0.80)
Plot characteristics
Log surface of plot (X1iht) −0.896
(−4.71)
−1.036
(−6.51)
−0.736
(−3.12)
−0.735
(−2.15)
Plot irrigation status (X1iht) 1.026
(1.27)
−0.196
(−0.41)
1.742
(2.10)
2.525
(2.12)
Predicted crop choice hazard rate (X2iht) 1.886
(1.01)
−2.536
(−1.78)
4.116
(1.95)
4.216
(1.25)
Joint signif. of soil types (X1iht): χ24
[p−value]
7.27
[0.20]
2.90
[0.71]
11.31
[0.04]
8.64
[0.12]
Joint signif. of cost shares (X2iht): χ28
[p−value]
1.01
[0.99]
0.70
[0.99]
2.71
[0.95]
0.86
[0.99]
Joint signif. of exclusion restrictions: χ24
[p−value]
6.38
[0.17]
1.16
[0.88]
1.63
[0.80]
1.05
[0.90]
Instrumental variables diagnostics
Test of overidentifying restrictions: p-value 0.882 0.249 0.869 0.441
Diﬀerence Hansen tests: p-values
Qvt(log surface of plot) valid IV 0.797 0.215 0.695 0.891
Qvt(area on other plots) valid IV 0.941 0.150 0.748 0.823
PvtX1iht valid IV versus QvPvtX1iht valid IV 0.927 0.368 0.818 0.669
Hahn-Hausman m3 test statistic: p-value 0.679 0.937 0.970 0.919
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